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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes U.S. security assistance to Turkey between 1950 and
1992. It describes historical trends in U.S.-Turkey arms transactions by
examining statistical expenditure data on seven components of the U.S. security
assistance program. The thesis identifies the impact of four key factors on U.S.
arms sales to Turkey during this period. These factors are the Korean War,
NATO, Greek-Turkish relations, and the Gulf War. Three different aspects of
arms sales - military, political and economic - are taken into consideration. The
roles played by Congress and the executive branch in influencing U.S. aid to
Turkey are examined. The thesis concludes that the Korean War, NATO, and the
Gulf War supported closer military ties between Turkey and the United States,
while disputes between Greece and Turkey tended to weaken it.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
1. General
Arms transfers among all countries in the last decade
have reached new levels since the end of World War II. Arms
sales have become big business and consequently a crucial
dimension of international affairs. Today more countries -
both developed and developing - have greater destructive
capabilities than ever before. Those sophisticated arms,
particularly in developing countries, represent one of the
most prominent and disquieting features of our era.
Arms imports are said to be indirect means of ensuring
a nation's defense, making it possible for recipient nations
to defend their security. They can be instruments of
diplomacy, used either to develop closer relations between
trading countries or to avoid their deterioration. Arms sales
are also said to buy influence and unseen leverage, which is
banked for use at critical times when the supplier nation
needs the support of foreign nations. [Ref l:p. 112]
The continuing scientific and technological
developments in our era made it possible to produce more
destructive, more accurate, and more numerous weapons systems
each year. However, for developing countries, it is extremely
difficult to produce a variety of advanced arms, based on high
technology. Often these countries do not have sufficient
internal economic resources for the establishment of an
advanced domestic arms industry. Because they still require
technologically advanced weapon systems for self defense
purposes, countries will continue to purchase required
military weaponry from international sources. [Ref 2: p. 2]
After World War II, the United States became the major
arms supplier for its allies and friendly countries. The
United States initially provided arms on a "grant aid" basis.
Later, when the recipient countries made significant economic
progress, "sales" replaced grant aid. Today, the transfer of
military weaponry from the United States to other countries is
accomplished in three ways: Grants, Loans, or Sales (Military
or Commercial)
.
To implement such world-wide transfers via the Sales
Program, the United States has developed the concept of
"Security Assistance," covering a broad range of programs
which employ funding and legal authority to provide defense
articles and training, economic support, and peacekeeping
assistance, to key friends and allies. Subcommittees within
Congress and organizations within the Departments of Defense
and State monitor these programs.
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and evaluate
the Security Assistance program used by the U.S. government to
supply military assistance to Turkey. It will explain the
trends in U.S. Security Assistance program components'
expenditures for Turkey between 1950 and the present. While
appraising the implementation of U.S. Security Assistance to
Turkey, I will take into consideration three different aspects
of arms sales - military, political and economic.
2. Objectives of the Thesis
The research and analysis involved in this thesis will
contribute to an understanding of the U.S. -Turkey security
assistance relationship during the 1950-1992 period. Turkish
officers who work in cooperation with U.S. officials relating
to the U.S. Security Assistance program will understand the
political dynamics affecting U.S. arms transfers, including
the relationship between foreign policy and arms transfer
policy.
3. Research Question
The primary research question is this: What factors
influenced U.S. arms sales to Turkey during the period of
1950-1992 and how did they affect the U.S. -Turkey defense
relationship?
Subsidiary questions include the following:
1) What is the current U.S. system for arms sales approval?
2) What is the role of Congress in considering legislation
opposing arms sales?
3) What is the trend in U.S. -Turkey arms transactions
historically?
4) What factors - political, military and economic - have
most influenced U.S. -Turkey arms transactions?
5) Does NATO play a significant role in U.S. security
assistance to Turkey?
6) What other factors affect U.S. arms sales to Turkey?
4. Scope and Limitation of Research
This thesis will focus on the objectives and content
of the Security Assistance provided to Turkey by the U.S.
during the period 1950-1992. I will investigate the seven
components of the Security Assistance program: Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction Sales
program, Foreign Military Financing program, Direct Commercial
Sales, International Military Education and Training program,
Economic Support Fund, Peacekeeping Operations and
Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund. Special attention is
given to the strategy associated with the operation of the
assistance program. Problems and concerns relating to the
changes in U.S. foreign policy and to changes in the global
security environment which affect U.S. -Turkey relations are
also addressed.
5. Organization of Study
Chapter I will discuss the objectives and methodology
of the thesis. Chapter II will explain the U.S. system for
arms sales approval. The following three issues will be
discussed in this chapter: 1) the objectives and components of
the U.S. Security Assistance program; 2) the roles and
responsibilities of the U.S. Government organizations involved
in Security Assistance; and 3) the constraints imposed by the
U.S. Congress on arms sales.
Chapter III will present the trends in U.S. -Turkey
arms transactions. In this chapter, statistical data (the
U.S. Security Assistance program components' expenditures for
Turkey between 1950 and 1992) will be investigated.
The context of U.S. -Turkey arms transactions will be
examined in Chapter IV. Special attention will be given to
political, military and economic factors that have most
influenced U.S. -Turkey arms transaction. Chapter V will
explain three significant events that have affected the U.S.-
Turkey defense relationship. These are the Korean War, Greek-
Turkey relations and the Gulf War. Conclusions will be
presented in Chapter VI.
B. BACKGROUND
1. History
Arms transfers have been part of international
relations as long as mankind has been involved in war. The
basic desire to obtain arms has not changed with time, only
the mechanisms of transfer have changed depending on policy,
the technology involved in the transfer, and the military and
political relations between trading countries. After World
War II, the terms of transfers have changed from "aid" to
"trade," arms have become more sophisticated, the focus has
shifted to Third World countries, and more countries have been
able to procure advanced and sophisticated arms. [Ref 2:p. 6]
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 marked the beginning of
the American policy of "long-term, patient but firm and
vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies." It
was this doctrine that first established a defense
relationship between Turkey and U.S. which eventually led
Turkey to join NATO in February 1952. The first
implementation of the Truman Doctrine consisted of two
agreements, one between the U.S. and Greece signed in June
1947, and another between the U.S. and Turkey in July 1947.
According to this second agreement, Turkey received $122.5
million of economic aid and $152.5 million in military
assistance from the U.S. for two years [Ref. 7:p. 9].
Through its assistance to Turkey, the United States
attempted to build up the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as
to improve logistics facilities. A series of bilateral
Turkish-American military agreements began, starting with the
Military Facilities Agreement of June 1954 and continuing
under the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of March
1980.
Between 194 6 and 1992 Turkey received more than $11
billion in military assistance, the specific form of
assistance changing over time, including grants, credits and
cash sales [Ref. 8:p. 174]. In 1993 Turkey received $450
million in aid from the United States, ranking third in the
list of recipients of U.S. aid, after Israel and Egypt [Ref.
9:p. 9].
Turkey's defense relationship with the U.S. was tested
by the Cyprus conflict, first in 1964, and again in 1974. The
persistence of intercommunal armed clashes in Cyprus after
December 1963, and the failure of both diplomatic attempts and
UN force in Cyprus to resolve the situation, led Turkey to
contemplate military intervention several times in 1964. In
June 1964 the U.S. warned Turkey against military action.
This warning (popularly known as "the Johnson letter")
forestalled Turkish intervention, but it also shook Turkey out
of the comfortable feeling of security it had found in NATO.
The dilemma posed by Cyprus and Greece which had
plagued Turkey's U.S. defense relations since 1964, reached a
new climax in the summer of 1974. Following Turkey's
intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, the U.S. Congress
imposed an arms embargo against Turkey on the grounds that
Turkish use of U.S. -supplied weapons during the intervention
was a violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the Foreign Military Sales Act. The effects of the Cyprus
conflict, the arms embargo, and the Greek-Turkish hostility
brought American-Turkish relations almost to a breaking point.
The arms embargo significantly affected Turkish defense
capabilities until a new defense agreement was signed on 3
March 1980. The arms embargo, which affected major weapons,
most adversely by the withholding of spare parts, tended to
highlight the extent of Turkey's dependence on U.S. goodwill
for the preservation of its defense capability.
During the Gulf War, Turkey's importance to the U.S.
appeared more evident. For the first time, the U.S. conducted
combat operations from Turkey, despite the deeply ingrained
sensitivities to foreign activities in the homeland felt by
the Turks. Beginning in August 1990 and lasting until
December 1991, Turkey gave its full support to Operation
Proven Force—the air combat operations conducted from Turkey
as an adjunct of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm—and for
Operation Provide Comfort -the Coalition effort to provide
humanitarian relief to more than 500,000 Kurdish refuges who
fled from the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein into southeastern
Turkey
.
2. The Place of the U.S. in World Arms Sales
Before 1935, total annual expenditures of all
governments for their war requirements were approximately $4.5
billion. In today's prices, these expenditures might
represent $40-50 billion. In 1991, approximate total world
expenditures were $1,038 billion. This dramatic increase was
due to Third World inventory modernization and expansion,
largely financed by profits from export income, particularly
oil. [Ref 2:p. 12]
The major political and economic transitions wrought
by the end of the Cold War resulted in a significant impact on
8
the world arms marketplace. The formal dissolution of the
USSR contributed to a sharp fall in Russia's arms agreements,
while the United States remained the undisputed leader in arms
sales to the world. In 1991, the United States accounted for
37.7 percent of world arms exports. While Washington is the
most prolific exporter of arms, arms production outside the
U.S., especially in Western Europe and developing countries,
is increasing both in scope and sophistication. Also, the
expansion of arms production in the developing countries since
the end of the World War II has been quite extensive. The
U.S. role in world arms transfers is depicted in Figures 1 and













































































































































Figure 2. U.S. Share of World Arms Exports, 1981-1991
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II. THE U.S. SYSTEM FOR ARMS SALES APPROVAL
A. WHAT IS SECURITY ASSISTANCE?
It is often said that security assistance is an "umbrella"
term. It is addressed in a statutory sense throughout the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (FAA) , and the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 as amended (AECA) . In Section 502B
of the FAA, security assistance is defined:
(d) For the purposes of this section . .
.
(2) the term "security assistance" means . .
.
(A) assistance under chapter 2 (military
assistance) or chapter 4 (economic support fund)
or chapter 5 (military education and training) or
chapter 6 (peacekeeping operations) or chapter 8
(anti-terrorism assistance) of this part;
(B) sales of defense articles or services,
extensions of credits (including participations
in credits) , and guarantees of loans under the
Arms Export Control Act; or
(C) any license in effect with respect to the
export of defense articles or defense services to
or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or
other internal security forces of a foreign
country under section 38 of the Arms Export
Control Act.
Within the President's Congressional Presentation Document
(CPD) for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1994, five
key programs are defined which reguire USG funding: the
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) ; the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) ; International Military Education and
12
Training (IMET) ; Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) ; and
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. A former component,
the Military Assistance Program (MAP) , was integrated into the
FMFP in FY 1990. These components, as well as some of the
other related activities, are discussed in more detail in this
chapter
.
In addition to appearing in the CPD to support the
Executive Branch's recommendations to Congress on program-
funding levels, security assistance shows up in budget
documents published by the Office and Management and Budget.
In the annual document entitled The Budget Of The United
States Government, "international security assistance" is
shown as consisting of foreign military financing, military
training and other, the economic support fund, and
peacekeeping operations. In the same budgetary document,
security assistance appears as part of the "International
Affairs: Foreign Aid" budget category. [Ref 4:p. 32-33]
Security assistance is also defined in documents published
by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub. 1-02,
published by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint
Staff) , defines security assistance as follows:
Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act
of 1976, as amended, and other related statutes by which
the United States provides defense articles, military
training, and other defense related services, by grant,
loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national
policies and objectives. [Ref 10:p. 327]
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In general, the United States offers security assistance
to strengthen the national security of friendly nations, and
to support existing or prospective democratic institutions and
market economies. Since World War II, security assistance has
become a institutionalized and continuing program used to
advance U.S. interests in a global environment. It is not
just a short-range program; rather, it is a continuing
program, the components and magnitude of which change each
year due to U.S. national interests and foreign policy
objectives. According to the 1994 CPD for Security Assistance
Programs, these objectives are:
1) Building democracy
2) Promoting and maintaining peace
3) Promoting economic growth and sustainable development
4) Addressing global problems
5) Meeting urgent humanitarian needs
The Security Assistance program is an important tool for
the U.S. Government to accomplish these objectives.
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COMPONENTS
As was noted earlier, according to the Congressional
Presentation Document (CPD) for the Security Assistance
Program, there are five key security assistance program
components which require United States Government funding. If
we add the Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military
14
Construction Sales Program, plus Direct Commercial Sales
licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) , we arrive
at a total of seven programs. A brief examination of each
follows.
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military
Construction Sales Program
FMS is a non-appropriated program through which
eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles,
services and training from the U.S. government. The
purchasing government pays all costs that may be associated
with a sale. In essence, there is a signed government-to-
government agreement (normally documented on a Letter of Offer
and Acceptance (LOA) ) between the U.S. government and a
foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a
"case" and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting
purposes
.
2. The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP or FMF)
This program has undergone a variety of substantive
and terminological changes in recent years. At present, the
program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and
loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase
U.S. defense articles, services and training. As a grant and
low interest loan program, FMFP is distinguished from FMS, the
system through which government-to-government sales of
military equipment occur. In general, FMFP provides financing
for FMS sales. Select countries, however, have been eligible
15
to use FMFP credits for procurement through direct commercial
contracts with U.S. firms outside of FMS channels.
Additionally, in FY 1990, the former Military
Assistance Program (MAP) , formally merged with the FMFP as
Congress adopted a Reagan Administration proposal for
integrating all MAP grant funding into the appropriations
account for the FMF Program. For FY 1994, the Clinton
Administration proposed a total of $4,087 billion FMF funding,
composed of $3,232 billion in grants and $855 million in
concessional loans. The same proposal includes $450 million
in concessional loans for Turkey [Ref 16:pp. 13-18].
3. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Licensed Under The Arms
Export Control Act
A direct commercial sale licensed under the AECA is a
sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer.
Unlike the procedures employed for FMS, direct commercial
sales transactions are not administered by Department of
Defense and do not involve a government-to-government
agreement. Rather, the U.S. governmental "control" procedure
is accomplished through licensing by the Office of Defense
Trade Control in the Department of State.
4. The International Military Education and Training
Program (IMET)
This program provides military education and training
in the United States and, in some cases, in overseas U.S.
military facilities to selected foreign military and related
16
civilian personnel on a grant basis. Since 1950, IMET and its
predecessor programs have trained more than 500,000 foreign
officers and enlisted personnel in areas ranging from
professional military education to basic technical and nation
building skills.
In FY 1989, Congress established a prohibition on the
use of IMET funds by any country whose annual per capita gross
national product (GNP) exceeds $2,349.00 unless that country
agrees to fund from its own resources the transportation costs
and living allowances (TLA) of its students. Thus IMET funds
have been restricted to financing tuition costs for these
countries. For FY 1994, the Administration allocated $2.8
million for Turkey out of the total proposed program of $42.5
million.
5. The Economic Support Fund
This fund was established to promote economic and
political stability in areas where the U.S. has special
political and security interests and where the U.S. has
determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping
to secure peace to avert major economic or political crises.
ESF is a flexible economic instrument which is made available
on a loan or grant basis for a variety of economic purposes,
including balance of payment support, infrastructure, and
other capital and technical assistance development projects.
17
The ESF program is administered by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) under the overall policy
direction of the Secretary of State. The Administration's FY
1994 request for $2.53 billion reflects a firm U.S. commitment
to assist other countries to achieve economic growth and
development.
6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, chapter
6, as amended, authorizes assistance to friendly countries and
international organizations for peacekeeping operations (PKO) .
Historically, funding under this statute has for the most part
been limited to support of the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
and the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO)
.
With the changing international security environment, the
number of situations requiring peacekeeping operations has
risen in the early 1990s. Consequently, the amount of this
fund can be expected to increase further in the years ahead.
For FY 1994, the Administration proposes a total of
$77,166 million for PKO. This amount will fund both long-
standing operations in Cyprus and the Sinai and necessary new
initiatives in the former Soviet Union, Haiti and Africa.
7. The Nonproliferation And Disarmament Fund
This program is a new element in the security
assistance budget. Following the collapse of the USSR,
disarmament of the four nuclear former Soviet Union states
18
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has moved to the
forefront of the U.S. national security agenda. To help meet
these needs, for FY 1994 the Administration proposed $50
million for a four-part nonproliferation and disarmament
program of Education and Training, Destruction and Conversion,
Enforcement and Interdiction, and Safeguards and Verification
[Ref 16:p. 35]
.
C. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
The U.S. Security Assistance program has its roots in U.S.
public laws which contain security assistance authorizations,
appropriations, restrictions and reporting requirements. To
understand how this legislation is welded into a coherent,
operational foreign policy program, it is appropriate to
briefly discuss the roles of the three branches of the U.S.
Federal Government with respect to security assistance.
1. Executive Branch: The President
The Constitution of the U.S. establishes the President
as the nation's chief executive and, by inference, the chief
arbiter in matters of foreign policy. Furthermore, the same
constitution empowers the President, by and with the consent
of the Senate to make treaties and appoint ambassadors and
other public ministers. The president is also authorized to
receive ambassadors and other public ministers - all essential
facets of carrying out U.S. foreign policy. Finally, it is
the President who presents the recommended annual U.S.
19
assistance program and budget to the Congress for its
consideration and executes this program once it becomes law.
As the chief executive, the President is responsible
for all of the activities of the Executive Branch. While
carrying out all these activities, the President has numerous
assistants, cabinet officers, and other subordinate officials
to oversee the conduct of the U.S. security assistance program
(See Figure 3)
.
2. Legislative Branch: The Congress
The Congress of the U.S., as provided by the U.S.
Constitution, is vested with all legislative powers. In terms
of security assistance, congressional power and influence are
exerted in several ways:
1) development, consideration, action on legislation to
establish or amend basic security assistance authorization
acts
;
2) enactment of appropriations acts;
3) passage of Joint Continuing Resolutions to permit the
incurrence of obligations to carry on essential security
assistance program activities until appropriation action is
complete;
4) conduct of hearings and investigations into special areas
of interest, to include instructions to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) , the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) , and Congressional Research Service (CRS) to
accomplish special reviews;
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With regard to conventional arms transfers or sales,
which constitute a major dimension of the U.S. security
assistance framework, the ultimate authority for such sales
resides in the U.S. Constitution, which assigns Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Through the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) , Congress has delegated
authority to the President to administer the arms transfer
program subject to statutorily prescribed standards and
conditions.
The work of preparing and writing legislation is
performed largely by committees of both houses of Congress.
Security assistance legislation must be both authorized and
appropriated. The committees which authorize this legislation
are the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. Appropriations for these
programs is done in the House in the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House
Appropriations Committee. In the Senate, appropriations for
security assistance is done in the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Issues
related to security assistance may also be treated by other
committees, e.g., the Committees on Armed Services, Banking,
and Finance.
22
3. Judicial Branch: The Courts
According to the Constitution of the U.S., Federal
courts are responsible for interpreting federal laws and
determining the constitutionality of U.S. law. Normally, the
courts have had limited involvement in the day-to-day
activities of security assistance. However, in holding all
statutory "legislative veto" provisions unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court of the U.S. invalidated several clauses of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) which permitted a "legislative
veto" of certain security assistance transfers. [Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)] These clauses
were amended in 1986.
D. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS
Funding for certain security assistance programs must be
authorized and appropriated. Five such programs include: the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) ; the
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) ; the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) ; Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) ; and the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. Foreign military cash
sales and commercial exports are also addressed in security
assistance legislation - not from a funding standpoint, since
U.S. appropriated dollars are not involved, but from a
reporting, control and oversight perspective.
23
1. Authorization Acts
With respect to the current U.S. security assistance
program, two basic laws are involved. They are: (1) the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and (2) the Arms
Export Control Act as amended. Both the FAA and AECA follow
a succession of earlier predecessor acts which served as the
basis for many of the provisions in the FAA and AECA.
a. The Foreign Assistance Act
Originally enacted on 4 September 19 61, this act
contains many provisions which were formerly in the Mutual
Security Act of 1954. Today, the FAA is the authorizing
legislation for IMET, ESF, PKO, overseas assistance program
management and a wide variety of other foreign assistance
programs
.
Jb. The Arms Export Control Act
This act came into being under a different title,
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (FMSA) . Before 1968,
the basic authority for foreign military sales was the FAA.
The FMSA served to incorporate the Foreign Military Sales
Program under a new and separate act. The International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976
changed the title of the FMSA to the AECA. The AECA is the
statutory basis for the conduct of FMS and the control of
commercial sales of defense articles and services.
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The FAA and the AECA may be amended by annual or biennial
security assistance authorization acts. Figure 4 identifies
the various acts discussed above in the context of their
relationship to one another.
2. Appropriations Acts
Security assistance appropriations are included in the
annual "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act" for each year. As its title
suggests, this act is the appropriation authority for several
programs, including security assistance.
If a new fiscal year begins before an appropriation
act has been approved, Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA)
is essential to keep the funded foreign assistance programs
from coming to a standstill. CRA is defined as:
The authority to obligate funds against the FMFP, IMET,
ESF, or other related security assistance appropriation
for the new fiscal year under a Continuing Resolution (CR)
granted by Congress in a Joint Resolution making temporary
appropriations prior to passage of the regular
appropriations act, or in lieu of such an act. Normally,
however, the CRA is for a designated period less than a
fiscal year, and such a CRA does not usually allow funding
for the start of any new programs. [Ref 4: p. 45]
For example, on 1 October 1992 there was no completed
FY 93 legislation for funding of military assistance and other
U.S. assistance programs. Consequently, an omnibus CR was
signed on that date extending foreign assistance programs
through 5 October 1992. On 6 October 1992 the FY 93 Foreign


































































3. Conditions Of Eligibility
While the U.S. government offers a variety of security
assistance programs to its allies and friendly nations,
Washington usually imposes some restrictions for those
countries which can not meet certain conditions. For example,
aid may be denied to countries which support terrorism or
which are in default on loans to the U.S. These requirements
are listed in the FAA and AECA.
E. NOTIFYING CONGRESS
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 197 6 requires the
President to notify the Congress of certain defense trade
export applications prior to their approval. Figure 5
provides a flowchart contrasting the FMS and commercial export
sale review provisions.
1. Foreign Military Sales
The AECA requires the President to submit a numbered
certification (with justification, impact, etc.) to the
Congress before issuing a letter of offer to sell defense
articles or services for $50 million or more, or any design
and construction services for $200 million or more, or major
defense equipment for $14 million or more. 1 The Letter of
1 Major Defense Equipment (MDE) means any item of
significant military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List
(USML) having a nonrecurring research and development cost of
more than $50 million or a total production cost of more than
$200 million.
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Offer and Acceptance (LOA) shall not be issued if the
Congress, within 3 calendar days after receiving such
certification, adopts a joint resolution stating it objects to
the proposed sale, unless the President states in his
certification that an emergency exists which requires such a
sale in the national security interest of the U.S. [Ref 5: Sec
36(b)(1)]. In order to provide the Congress with sufficient
time to review such cases, the Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSAA) has agreed to provide the Congress with 20 days
advance notification of such cases prior to the formal
submission of the 3 day statutory notification [Ref 6: Sec
703] .
An exception to the above procedure exists for NATO,
NATO member countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. For
these "exempted" countries, the formal statutory notification
period is only 15 days. Furthermore, the 20 days advance
notification period is not required for these exempt
countries.
2. Direct Commercial Sales
According to the AECA, the President must submit a
numbered certification to the Congress thirty days before the
issuance of any export license for Major Defense Equipment in
excess of $14 million or other defense articles/services in
excess of $50 million. Unless the President states in his
certification that an emergency exists, an export license for
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the items shall not be issued within a 3 calendar day
congressional review period. Further, such license shall not
be issued if the Congress, within such 3 0-day period, adopts
a joint resolution objecting to the export; however, NATO,
NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, are exempt
from this joint resolution provision. [Ref 5: Sec. 36(c)]
The President may require that any defense article or
service be sold under FMS in lieu of commercial export
channels. He may also require that persons engaged in
commercial negotiations keep the President fully informed. [Ref
5:Sec. 38(a) (3)
]
3. Congressional Joint Resolutions
As indicated above, the AECA contains provisions for
the congressional rejection of proposals for specific types of
FMS and direct commercial sales. The mechanism for such
Congressional action is a "joint resolution." This is a
statement of disapproval to a proposed sale, transfer, or
lease. The JR must be passed by simple majority votes in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Such a joint
resolution must be sent to the President for review and
approval. Since the President is unlikely to approve the
rejection of an action which his Administration originally
proposed to Congress, the President will likely veto such a
joint resolution, returning it to Congress. Unless Congress
is able to override the President's veto by obtaining a two-
30
thirds majority vote in each House in support of the original
resolution of rejection, the sale, transfer, or lease will be
permitted. However, if Congress can muster sufficient votes
to override the President's veto, the proposed sale, transfer,
or lease would not be permitted.
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III. U.S. -TURKEY ARMS TRANSACTIONS: ELEMENTS AND SCOPE
Since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, there has
been a close military relationship between the United States
and the Republic of Turkey. In order to understand the nature
of this relationship and its evolution during the past 47
years, we will analyze Turkey's share of U.S. Security
Assistance between 1950 and 1992. The data for this analysis




In order to explain the trend in the Turkish-American
defense relationship in terms of Security Assistance program
components, annual expenditures are converted into graphs.
The graphs used to present the data are drawn for every
Security Assistance program component, and three different
positions are depicted to assist in interpreting the U.S.-
Turkey assistance relationship. These positions are: 1) The
graphs that depict only Turkey's shares; 2) The graphs that
compare Turkey and the world; and 3) The graphs that compare
Turkey and Europe.
2 DSAA, established as a separate agency of the
Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and
control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the
only authorized source of such data. The data used in this
research was taken from a report entitled "Fiscal Year Series
as of September 30, 1992," published by the FMS Control &
Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA. This data is provided in
the Appendix.
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Not included in this research are two current Security
Assistance program components - Peacekeeping Operations and
Nonproliferation & Disarmament funds. This is because they
are not allocated to Turkey. The Economic Support Fund (ESF)
is also excluded because this fund is allocated to countries
only for economic development, and select countries are not
allowed to spend this fund for military purposes. As a
result, the remaining four program components are investigated
in this thesis.
A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) graphs represent the total
dollar value of defense articles and defense services
delivered to Turkey for fiscal years 1950-1992. Defense
articles and services can be purchased with cash, credit and
Military Assistance Program (MAP) Merger Funds by a foreign
government in any fiscal year. In this analysis, Foreign
Military Sales Deliveries are used because they represent the
actual dollar value of arms sales transactions which occurred
under this fund every year.
After implementing a Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
agreement, the responsible military department directs release
of material from stocks, procurement, provision of services,
or training. As execution progresses, the military department
reports incurred expenditures and physical deliveries within
30 days of the date of shipment or performance. Figures 6,7
33
and 8 represent Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deliveries to
Turkey
.
B. THE FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM (FMFP)
Although this program currently makes grants and loans,
many programs that have been terminated during the period of
1950-1992 can be included in this category. Two different
accounts - Foreign Military Financing Direct and Foreign
Military Financing Guaranty - were added in order to form the
FMFP loan component. The combination of four other accounts -
Foreign Military Financing Waived, MAP Merger Funds, MAP
Deliveries and Excess MAP/MASF Deliveries - are treated as the
FMFP grant component.
Some double counting may have occurred here because some
of these accounts may have been used in several places. For
example, the amount of credit extended to Turkey (FMFP loans)
may be applied to FMS or commercial procurement contracts.
MAP Merger funds are included in FMS funds and in order to
identify the FMFP grants component, it was added to the other
three accounts. Figures 9, 10, 11 represent the FMFP grants
and Figures 12, 13, 14 represent the FMFP loans.
C. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES (DCS)
Direct Commercial Sales represent the total dollar value
of deliveries made against purchases of munitions-controlled
items by the Turkish government directly from U.S.
34
manufacturers. The Commercial Export Deliveries account in
the data tables were used to compute DCS. Figures 15, 16 and
17 depict Direct Commercial Sales to Turkey.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM
(IMET)
The IMET program in the data tables represents the total
dollar value allocated in every fiscal year for the training
of Turkish military students both overseas and in the
continental United States, and the cost of training aids and
materials associated with such training. It is considered
fully delivered when funded. Figures 18, 19 and 20 represent
the IMET program account for Turkey.
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Figure 13. FMFP Loans, World Total and Turkey 1950-1992
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Figure 14. FMFP Loans, European Total and Turkey 1950-1992
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IV. THE CONTEXT OF U.S. -TURKEY ARMS TRANSACTIONS
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. -TURKEY DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
Turkey is a new country in an old land. Although the
first historical references to the Turks appear in Chinese
records of about 200 B.C., Anatolia (as a geographical
expression, it is synonymous with Asia Minor) has been
homeland to the Turks since the eleventh century. The modern
Turkish state - the Republic of Turkey - was established on
29 October 1923, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk. The new state is the successor to the Ottoman
Empire, which was for centuries a great power in Europe.
In terms of the size of its population and economy, Turkey
is not one of the great powers, though it is the strongest
among the countries of the Middle East. Its role as a bridge
between the Middle East and the West has given it a unique
opportunity to combine both cultures.
Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, geopolitical factors
have largely determined Turkey's relations with other nations.
A strategic position on the Straits has projected the country
into the arena of power politics. While maintaining a firm
commitment to its Western allies, Turkey has demonstrated its
independence by improving relations with Russia and Central
Asian Republics and strengthening ties with the Middle East.
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It can be said that its defense relationship with the U.S. has
evolved from two different aspects, one geopolitical, the
other socio-economic.
1. Geopolitical Aspects
The features of Turkey's geography most relevant to
the U.S. -Turkey defense relationship are the Straits
connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and the Anatolian
high plateau. These are routes from the Russian plains to the
Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf, as well as routes in
the opposite direction. Through the Dardenelles and the
Bosporus, which are connected by the Sea of Marmara, Turkey
monitors and controls passage between the Black and
Mediterranean Seas. As guardian of the Straits, Turkey can
deny passage through these waterways and would do so if this
were required for its safety in time of war or by its status
as a neutral. Rival powers, especially Russia, have in the
past been interested in denying Turkey exclusive control over
the Straits and may be again in the future.
As Turkey is the only nation between Europe and the
sources of much of the Arab oil, it provides a strategic
communication and transportation link from sources of this
important commodity to its users. Additionally, as a member
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , Turkey
provides - along with Greece - the first line of defense for
NATO's southern flank. With the end of the Cold War, many
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thought Turkey s importance and strategic merit had diminished
significantly. As the Gulf War clearly demonstrated, Turkey
is the most stable and reliable country in a region which has
suffered political instability and turmoil for decades. It
can be expected that Turkey will remain so in the future.
It can be argued that these factors shape Turkey's
relationship to the U.S. But this is not the entire story.
Turkey's socio-economic improvement is another agent in the
shaping of this relationship.
2. Socio-economic Aspects
Today's Turkey is Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's creation.
The tradition of Ataturk (Kemalism) as a Turkish ideology has
provided the broad framework within which the Turkish people
strive for a bright future. The twin goals set by Ataturk put
a fundamental imprint on the future course of Turkey's
relations with other nations.
The goals are to preserve the independence of Turkey
within its national boundaries and to continue its
modernization. The major implications of these goals are
peaceful relations with foreign powers and development along
the lines of the contemporary civilization of the West.
Although the great majority of Turks are Muslims, the
religious-political-civil code of Islam that regulates all
aspects of human life is no longer to be taken as the ultimate
authority. Thus, the modern Turkish state is the only secular
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state in the Islamic world. While it is trying to establish
a strong industrial base and complete its economic
development, Turkey has enjoyed democratic freedoms and
institutions for most of the past seventy-one years. In
short, Turkey's domestic political, economic and social
structure is now more diverse as well as more developed.
Turkish dedication to Europe has its roots in the
establishment of the modern Turkish state. In the eyes of
Ataturk and his followers, there was one civilization, the
Western one, and they would join it "in spite of the West."
Turkey's Western orientation and its willingness to take part
in the contemporary world attracted U.S. attention to Turkey.
Although the United States established its formal ties with
the Ottoman Empire on 7 May 1830 with the signing of a treaty,
relations remained undeveloped during the following years. In
fact, this treaty contained a secret article that promised
that the U.S. would build and sell warships to the empire.
The U.S. Senate rejected this secret article and the treaty
was ratified by both sides without the secret article.
However, with the considerable assistance by the first
American representative to the Ottoman Empire, the sultan
obtained the services of a number of U.S. shipbuilders. [Ref
ll:p. 13]
Following World War II, Soviet diplomatic pressure in
Turkey and communist guerilla actions in Greece became a
concern for United States. It was this concern and the U.S.
54
policy of containment of communism that stimulated a close
defense relationship between Turkey and the U.S.
It can be argued that this relationship has evolved
from a common fear and threat for decades. However, both
countries now enjoy a more mature relationship. It is not
limited only to defense. Every year they trade more with each
other and U.S. investments in Turkey are rapidly increasing.
Turkish desire for a broader or expanded "strategic
relationship" with U.S. is today an important Turkish foreign
policy goal.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. -TURKEY DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP, 19 5 0-
1992
In order to facilitate the interpretation and analysis of
the data on U.S. -Turkey arms transactions, it is useful to
divide them into three different groups. First, data showing
Turkey's share of U.S. security assistance, in five different
aid categories, is displayed (Figures 6, 9, 12, 15 and 18).
Second, Turkey's share of U.S. security assistance is compared
with assistance to Europe (Figures 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20).
Finally, Turkey's share of U.S. security aid is compared to
aid provided to the rest of the world (Figures 7, 10, 13, 16
and 19)
.
This kind of classification is thought to make more sense
for arriving at some generalizations and obtaining a plausible
pattern for U.S. -Turkey defense relationship. Although this
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thesis does not include a detailed mathematical analysis of
the data, Figures 6 through 20 reflect certain facts and
trends affecting U.S. -Turkey defense cooperation during 1950-
1992. Three important dimensions of this relationship - the
Korean War, Greek-Turkey relations and the Gulf War - will be
investigated in more detail in Chapter V.
1. Group I
The figures which constitute group I reflect the basic
fact that the scope of U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey has
changed over time. During the 1950s and 1960s grants are
dominating in terms of military assistance to Turkey. IMET
expenditures (Figure 18) and FMFP grants (Figure 9) constitute
the largest share of aid in this period. The main reason for
this may be the United States' willingness to share the
substantial arsenal which it formed during World War II. It
should be kept in mind that Turkey did not have the necessary
economic base for such armaments during those years. The
combination of these two conditions resulted in the fact that
the backbone of the U.S. -Turkey defense relationship has been
grants.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the situation changed
dramatically. The loans component of the U.S. Security
Assistance program to Turkey (Figure 12) gained more
importance. It increased significantly while the grants
component also went up rapidly. It can be said that grants
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continued to be a major component of U.S. Security Assistance
to Turkey in this period and that loans didn't replace them.
A second important point is the attitude of the U.S.
Congress towards Turkey. From the early 1950s until the mid-
1970s, the president and the national security bureaucracy
were the key players that shaped the U.S. foreign and defense
policy [Ref 12:p. 4]. In the era of the "imperial
presidency," the executive branch was the center of the U.S.
foreign and defense policy universe [Ref 12:p. 4]. Beginning
in the early 1950s, members of Congress increasingly defined
their role in foreign policy as one of deferring to the wishes
of the president. 3
The debacle in Vietnam shattered the norm of
congressional deference. In the aftermath of Vietnam,
Congress attempted to reassert its role in the foreign policy
process. 4 More important, following the Watergate crisis, the
resignation of President Nixon created a power vacuum in the
U.S. foreign and defense policy and Congress naturally moved
3 Although congressional deference to the executive
branch was never complete, on most foreign policy issues
members of Congress eagerly followed the lead of the
president. (Carroll 1966; Kolodziej 1975; Manley 1971; Moe and
Teel 1971; Robinson 1967; Ripley and Lindsay 1993)
4 The general assertion of congressional power versus the
Executive Branch was particularly prominent in the early
1970s, when Congress not only exercised greater budgetary
oversight, but also passed the War Powers Resolution over
President Nixon's veto, compelled an end to U.S. bombing in
Indochina, prohibited U.S. aid to anti-Marxist forces in
Angola, and conducted hearings to investigate hitherto secret
activities of the CIA.
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into this vacuum. It can be argued that Vietnam War and the
Watergate crisis are the two factors that stimulated the
reassertion of congressional power in foreign and defense
affairs.
A prominent example is the arms embargo imposed on
Turkey in 1975 despite the administration's reluctance. The
embargo which was initiated and enacted with strong pressure
by the Congress suspended all U.S. military aid to Turkey.
From the U.S. point of view, the embargo represents one of a
series of legislative initiatives in foreign policy at a time
of a weakened Executive Branch. Congress played the
determining role in the embargo issue.
In the 1980s Congress wielded increasing influence on
U.S. defense and foreign policy. However, both the Reagan
administration and its successor Bush administration
continuously struggled to maintain a strong Executive Branch
despite the congressional involvement. The Republican
administrations and its conservative allies in the media, the
public policy community, and the Congress were determined to
roll back congressional advances into defense policy [Ref l:p.
18] .
The defense budget was increased sharply with the full
participation of the conservative Congress elected in 1980.
Throughout the 1980s, however, Congress continued to become
increasingly more assertive in determining the characteristics
of U.S. military forces and weapons, modifying ever more
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weapon programs in ever greater detail. Beginning in 1985 the
Congress first leveled off and then reversed the continuing
defense buildup requested by the administration.
In 198 6, against the administration's fervent
opposition, Congress passed a sweeping reorganization of the
U.S. military establishment that reduced the power of the
individual armed services in favor of joint military
institutions [Ref l:p. 19]. In the area of arms transfers, as
well, Congress intervened successfully more often in the 1980s
than in the 1970s [Ref 1: p. 20].
Finally, congressional oversight of covert operations
also became stronger in the 1980s, with specific legislated
restrictions modifying several operations that the
administration either planned or began in Central America. As
revealed during the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987, the
administration found a variety of ways to circumvent some of
these restrictions. But these circumventions and the
consequent reduced scale of the operations are testament to
congressional power. [Ref l:p.20]
In conclusion, it can be argued that although both the
Reagan and Bush administrations sought to limit congressional
involvement in defense policy making, with only a few specific
exceptions the Congress's role expanded even further in the
1980s.
In the light of the above discussion, it can be
acknowledged that 1950s, 1960s and 1980s witnessed very strong
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U.S. presidents and relatively weak Congresses. However, the
1970s was a decade where weak U.S. presidents were confronted
with strong opposition in Congress.
The implications of these two different positions have
been enormous for Turkey. Grants and loans to Turkey were
greater and more diverse under a strong president, but not so
under a strong Congress. The 1970s witnessed a steep decline
in U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, both in scope and
magnitude, dropping to zero for some of this period. In
short, it can be said that congressional involvement has been
devastating for Turkey. Although Turks often connect
Congress' attitude with the strong Greek lobby, group II and
group III figures depict a different view on this controversy.
That is, the Greek lobby's influence on U.S. embargo decision
was not significant.
The third important observation is the small amount of
Direct Commercial Sales to Turkey in contrast to the high
volume of the other programs. According to Figure 15, Turkey
only used this account effectively in late 1980s and early
1990s. If 1976, 1977 and 1978 are excluded—because these
years represent very small amounts—one explanation for this
pattern is the expansion of the Turkish economy in the 1980s.
While the Turkish economy is more market oriented and
exports enjoyed a significant increase, Turkey has also sought
sources outside the U.S. government to acquire defense goods
and services. Although Turkey has not completely integrated
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its economy with the world, this burst of economic activity
introduced another opportunity for Turkey to obtain U.S. arms.
A stronger economy made it possible for Turkey to take
advantage of Direct Commercial Sales.
The fourth observation is the steady, twenty-year
increase in FMS Deliveries. As Figure 6 represents, despite
the fact that Deliveries witnessed considerable decreases in
some years (1977, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1988 and 1991), both
countries established and maintained good government-to-
government relations with regard to defense cooperation and
collaboration. Between 1980 and 1983, when Turkey was under
a military government, and the following 1983-1990 Motherland
party government years under the leadership of Mr. Ozal,
Turkey encouraged this process. Although it is not accurate
to explain this trend with the sympathy felt by two sides, it
is a well-known fact that these two regimes continuously
sought strong U.S. support and took great pains to develop
good relations with the U.S.
Another observation is more relevant to the political
aspect of this relationship. The Republic of Turkey had been
governed by military leadership twice since its establishment.
The first military government occurred between 19 60 and 1962
and the second one between 1980 and 1983. According to Figure
9, FMFP Grants declined substantially during the first
military takeover. Although Figure 18 depicts the peak
amounts in IMET expenditures for Turkey during this period, it
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can be noticed that immediately following this period they
witnessed substantial decline.
In the case of the second military takeover, Figures
6,9,12,15 and 18 represent a different view. During this
period FMFP Loans (Figure 12) , IMET expenditures (Figure 18)
and DCSs (Figure 15)—except for 1983, when a relatively small
decline occurred—demonstrate steady increases for Turkey.
However, both FMFP Grants (Figure 9) and FMS Deliveries
(Figure 6) represent first a decline—in 1981—followed by
increases.
These two periods of military government in Turkey
reflect two different types of U.S. response. The first
military intervention into Turkish politics followed a more
independent and distant policy towards the U.S. [Ref 13 :p. 85-
89] . However, the second military government took a more
moderate and harmonious approach with regard to its relations
to the U.S. [Ref 14:p. 290].
Another important point is the difference in world
order during these two different time periods. Iran and
Afghanistan fell out of the U.S. alliance system in the late
1970s and the chaos in Turkey was growing each day. From the
U.S. point of view, the 1980 military takeover secured Turkey
for the West and saved the country from a possible Civil War
whose consequences could never be predicted. In short, it can
be argued that despite the United State's formal, political
opposition to the emergence of military governments in Turkey
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in both cases, in practice the U.S. supported the second
military government more than the first one because of the
security climate at the time.
The last observation deals with the arms embargo
imposed on Turkey by the U.S. Congress. This embargo had been
effective between 1975 and 1978. The Turkish intervention in
Cyprus in 1974 was a factor in the embargo, but this is not
the entire story. Relations between Turkey and the U.S.
started to deteriorate prior to 1974, when heroin addiction in
the United States as a result of Vietnam War became a great
concern. As early as 1966, the Washington began to insist
that the poppy crop in Turkey should be completely eradicated.
Although the poppy was a major cash crop in Turkey and there
was considerable reluctance to comply with the U.S. request,
under the pressure of the U.S. the Turkish government agreed
in 1971 to ban all poppy growing. The decision was very
unpopular in Turkey and became a major symbol of Turkish
subservience to U.S. interests. In the elections of 1973,
every major party opposed the poppy ban and after the
elections the new government made it clear to the U.S. that
poppy cultivation would resume without regard to the 1971
agreement
.
U.S. reaction was immediate. On 13 March 1974,
Representative Charles Rangel announced that he would propose
cutting off all aid to Turkey if the poppy ban was lifted. On
30 June 1974, the U.S. State Department ordered the U.S.
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ambassador to "return for consultation, " a traditional means
of displaying official displeasure. On 9 July 1974,
Representative Lester Wollf introduced a bill to cut off aid
to Turkey unless the opium poppy ban was reinstituted; this
bill had 238 co-sponsors. On 2 August 1974, after the Cyprus
problem had begun, the full House voted to cancel all aid to
Turkey. Only considerable pressure by the administration
prevented this bill from becoming law. Turkey instituted
strict controls over the opium fields, a policy that the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency considered satisfactory.
Subsequently, the poppy problem was replaced by the Cyprus
problem as the major issue between the U.S. and Turkey. [Ref
ll:p. 25]
While the issue of cutting aid to Turkey was already
before the House because of the poppy question, Turkish
intervention in Cyprus and the use of U.S. armaments in
violation of several major arms agreements became an issue for
Congress. On 24 September 1974, the House passed an amendment
to the Continuing Resolution on Foreign Aid (307-90) that
banned military aid and sales to Turkey unless the President
certified that Turkey had made substantial progress toward an
agreement on Cyprus. This was followed by a presidential veto
of the Foreign Aid Act because of the amendment on Turkish
Aid, a veto that was sustained on 15 October 1974. After
repeated efforts to prevent any aid cutoff from becoming law,
on 18 December 1974 the President signed into law P.L. 93-559,
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which suspended all U.S. military aid to Turkey. On 5
February 1975 this embargo became effective. [Ref 11: p. 56]
DCSs to Turkey were resumed by P.L. 94-104 on 6
October 1975. Although MAP funds were included in foreign aid
authorizations for fiscal years 1975, 1976 and 1977, the
Foreign Assistance Act continued to preclude obligation of
these funds. The International Security Assistance Act of
1978, forwarded to the Congress on 21 March 1978, repealed the
prohibitions on MAP aid to Turkey.
All the figures confirm the information presented
above. Although Figures 9 and 18 depict zero dollar amounts
to Turkey during 1976, 1977 and 1978, FMFP Loans (Figure 12)
represent a steady increase. FMS Deliveries in Figure 6
—
except for a steep decline in 1977—and DCSs in Figure 15
demonstrate that some arms shipments occurred to Turkey during
the arms embargo period.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the U.S. imposed
a selective embargo on arms transactions with Turkey. While
Turkey was prohibited from receiving U.S. grant funds, it did
acquire U.S. armaments by loans and cash purchases. Contrary
to common opinion in Turkey, the U.S. did not stop all arms
shipments to Turkey. It only shifted the scope of its
security assistance to Turkey.
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2. Group II
The figures which make up the second group have a
general point (with the exception of Direct Commercial Sales,
Figure 17, of which Turkey's share is almost negligible) . For
most of the period of 1950-1992, Turkey followed almost the
same pattern that Europe followed. It should be noted here
the term "Europe" is not synonymous with "NATO". Some
countries [e.g., Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Sweden] located in
Europe didn't take part in NATO. Although they are not NATO
members, they benefitted from The U.S. Security Assistance
program. However, their portion is very small and for
practical purposes it can be accepted that European figures
also represent NATO's portion in the U.S. Security Assistance
program. In conclusion, Turkey's share of U.S. arms aid has
more or less followed the pattern of U.S. aid to Europe.
The second important point reinforces the first two
observations made in group I. The 1950s and 19 60s witnessed
large amount of grants (Figures 11 and 20) . During the 197 0s
the loans component (Figure 14) made significant increases and
with the beginning of the 1980s European countries enjoyed
large amounts of grants while at the same time benefitting
from loans. It can be argued that the change in the scope of
U.S. Security Assistance program was not exclusively for
Turkey. In short, the U.S. policy change has affected all
countries in Europe and Turkey in the same way.
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The last important point is that compared to the high
amount of Direct Commercial Sales to Europe, Turkey's share is
quite small. This appraisal is also consistent with the third
observation made in group I. Although European countries got
in touch with U.S. weapons manufacturers in order to obtain
arms during early 1970s, Turkey waited until late 1980s to
benefit from this alternative. During the 1950s and 1960s
Europe recovered from the destruction of World War II and
completed its economic development. The 1970s and 1980s were
decades during which Europe enjoyed large trade surpluses with
other countries. It is plausible that these surpluses allowed
them to purchase defense goods and services directly from U.S.
firms outside U.S. government channels.
It should be noted here, as Figure 8 clearly depicts,
during 1950s and 1960s Europe used FMS Deliveries instead of
DCSs. Following the economic development of the 1970s and




The interpretation of group III figures is a little
more difficult than the other two groups. This difficulty
arises from the large amount of dollars which each account for
the entire world contains with respect to Turkey's small
portion of them. It is also remarkable that although the
entire report lists 2 01 countries for which these dollars are
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spent, Turkey still represents a significant portion of them.
Thus, it can be argued that U.S. has given special attention
and value to Turkey for the whole period of 1950-1992.
One observation pertaining to the figures for the
first and second groups is also valid for the third group.
That is the change in the scope of U.S. Security Assistance
program components. The 1950s and 1960s have been the decades
when the grants component - as Figures 19 and 10 clearly
depict - played the major role. Although the loans component
(Figure 13) was first introduced in the late 1950s, the 1970s
have been the decade when loans enjoyed a significant
increase, while grants witnessed noticeable decline. During
the 1980s the grants component increased again and reached the
peak amount for the entire period. Although loans did not
disappear, they showed significant decline and at the end of
the period they represent a very small amount compared to the
past 42 years. This conclusion supports the two observations
made in the first and second groups. It can be argued that
this trend has affected all recipients of U.S. military
assistance. Except for the period of the U.S. arms embargo to
Turkey between 1976 and 1978, aid to Turkey resembled aid to
all other countries.
Figures 7 and 10, however, suggest a deviation from
this pattern. Until the late 1970s, Turkey's share of FMS
Deliveries is almost negligible, in spite of the high amounts
of grants (Figure 10). One reason for this is that U.S.
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contributions for grants have been mostly in the form of
excess defense articles and services instead of hard currency.
This policy inevitably resulted in Turkey's inability to
purchase contemporary arms through government-to-government
contracts. Instead, Turkey acquired excess weapons from
surplus stocks of over age and technologically inferior
equipment which the U.S. wanted to eliminate from its
inventory to make room for new, advanced ones.
Another important point concerns Turkey s share of
Direct Commercial Sales compared to the share for the rest of
the world. Again, this observation is consistent with the two
observations made in first and second groups. That is,
Turkey's portion of Direct Commercial Sales made to the world
is almost negligible. Turkey did not benefit from DCSs until
the late 1980s. Turkey relied heavily on FMS Deliveries and
U.S. excess defense weapons during this period.
The last important point deals with the arms embargo
imposed on Turkey between 1976 and 1978. Both IMET
expenditures (Figure 19) and FMFP Grants (Figure 10) represent
a zero level during this period for Turkey. The important
point is that these two accounts bottomed out for all other
countries during this same period. In short, it can be argued
that although Turkey did not benefit from these two accounts
between 1976 and 1978, neither did many other countries, since
the U.S. cut IMET and FMFP aid to all recipients during this
period.
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V. SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS
While appraising the U.S. -Turkey defense relationship
between 1950 and 1992, considerable attention must be given to
three important historical events. These three events can be
accepted as determining the fundamental nature of this
relationship. Their effects, both positive and negative, are
still apparent. These three events are the Korean War, Greek-
Turkish relations and the Gulf War.
A. THE KOREAN WAR
By mid-1948, the U.S. had become interested in
establishing a formal collective security arrangement for
Europe. In March 1948, when England, France, Belgium,
Holland, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact for
collective defense, the U.S. announced its support of this
arrangement, and by June of that year the U.S. was actively
engaged in laying the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. NATO, an alliance originally envisaged as
restricted exclusively to Western European states, officially
came into being in April 1949 with no provision for Turkish
membership. [Ref 13: p. 35]
Because it was not geographically located in the immediate
Atlantic area, Turkey was not invited to become a charter
member of the organization. This fact was not viewed with
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pleasure by the Turks, for it was felt that being excluded
from NATO could cause a reduction in the amount of aid coming
from the U.S. Some Turkish leaders also expressed concern
that by barring further Soviet encroachment in Western Europe,
NATO might induce the USSR to increase pressure on less firmly
protected points such as Turkey. [Ref 13:p. 36]
Throughout 1948 and 1949, the Turkish government
continually tried to join NATO. Although the U.S. repeatedly
expressed sympathy for Turkish participation, opposition from
the European members of the alliance, especially the British
and Scandinavians, prevented Turkish admission [Ref 13:p. 37].
The Korean War provided Turkey a new opportunity to join the
organization
.
The Korean War broke out one week after the first
multiparty elections are held in Turkey. A new government
took office with a landslide victory on 14 May 1950. On 27
June 1950 the UN Security Council invited the organization's
members to repel an armed attack by North Korea, aided and
abetted by the USSR, against the Republic of Korea. In
response to this request, the Turkish government offered to
send a mixed brigade of 4,500 men to the conflict. This unit
was the third largest to participate in this action, after the
American and South Korean forces. As a result of their
distinguished actions, the Turks were highly praised by the
other forces. [Ref 17:p. 10]
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To make use of the advantage provided by the actions of
their troops, the Turkish government made a formal request to
join NATO on 1 August 1950. The NATO members, not wishing at
that time to openly antagonize the Soviets by accepting
members at their very border, decided upon a compromise.
Turkey, along with Greece, who had previously requested
membership, were not offered full membership status, but were
invited to join in the planning of the NATO military strategy
for the Mediterranean area. Both nations accepted this
proposal, and in October 1950 became "partial" members of
NATO. The following September both the U.S. and Britain
proposed that they be allowed to become full members. This
proposal was accepted by the organization and on February 18,
1952, Turkey and Greece became full members of NATO. [Ref 17: p.
11]
From the Turkish point of view, the Korean War was
critical to Turkish participation in NATO. First, U.S.
military and economic aid was automatically guaranteed,
because Turks regarded NATO as an extension of the U.S.
Acceptance by the Atlantic alliance was also an act confirming
Turkish belief that Turks were, and should be recognized as,
an integral part of Europe. Furthermore, the image of the
U.S. as the protector of small nations had been confirmed
again with the Korean War. Subsequently, Turkish opinion
makers felt the greatest confidence in the U.S. [Ref 13:p. 44]
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From the U.S. point of view, the communist invasion of
South Korea clearly showed to the West that its security might
be immediately jeopardized. The aggression proved that the
Soviet Union possessed the capability of "taking, or inspiring
through satellites, military action ranging from local
aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the
Soviet world to all-out general war" [Ref 18:p.l01]. As
President Truman expressed it in his message to Congress on 19
July 1950, "...the U.S. is required to increase its military
strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression
in Korea but also to increase ourcommon defense with other
free nations, against aggression." Furthermore, although the
USSR may not have desired a general war, it hoped to exploit
the crisis to break up NATO [Ref 18:p. 102]. The major
contest, then, between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was not just over
Korea but concerned the steadfastness of U.S. commitments
abroad.
Under these assessments, it is quite plausible that the
Korean War stimulated the immediate need to support other
friendly nations against potential communist aggression. This
need applied to Turkey, which had for years suffered demands
from the USSR for the cession of three provinces and the right
to station troops on the Bosporus.
These conclusions are also consistent with the Figures 8,
9, 10, 11, 18, 19 and 20. FMS Deliveries (Figure 8) came into
being with the Korean War and showed significant increases in
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the following years. FMFP Grants (Figures 9, 10, 11)
witnessed substantial increases with the outbreak of the war
and as Figure 11 demonstrates, Europe (NATO) was the major
beneficiary of this account between 1950 and 1955. IMET
Expenditures also enjoyed steep increases and again, as Figure
20 depicts, Europe received the lion's share between 1950 and
1955.
The Korean War led the U.S. to strengthen its commitment
to Turkey's defense. Bilateral relations gained a new
dimension with Turkish participation in NATO. Consequently,
the U.S. -Turkey defense relationship was significantly
enhanced and Turkish integration with the West encouraged.
B. GREECE-TURKEY RELATIONS
The relationship between Greece and Turkey has been
characterized by severe tensions since the revolution that
brought Greece independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821.
Historical antagonisms and suspicions have persisted in spite
of their status as NATO allies. Relations between the two
countries remained potentially explosive in the 1970s and
1980s, with conflict centering on the problem of Cyprus and
control of the Aegean Sea and airspace. Disputes between
Turkey and Greece have served to complicate both countries'
relationships, not only with each other, but also with the
U.S.
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1. The Cyprus Problem
Cyprus is an island of 3,572 square miles, located in
the Mediterranean about 40 miles from Turkey and 60 miles from
Syria. It is strategically located, in that military forces
operating from Cyprus could dominate southern Turkey and much
of the eastern Mediterranean.
From 1571 until 1878, the island was a part of the
Ottoman Empire, that is, under Turkish sovereignty. Because
of its strategic location, beginning in 19th century, Britain
showed great interest to Cyprus in quest of security for its
trade routes to India. In 1878, Britain leased Cyprus from
the Ottoman Empire for 30 years, primarily for use as a naval
base.
When the Ottoman Empire was drawn into World War I,
Britain formally annexed Cyprus as a colony. This ended the
period of Turkish sovereignty over the island. The new
Turkish republic, founded in the aftermath of World War I,
agreed to this arrangement and until the 1950s the situation
on the island remained relatively static.
In 1958, the British changed their view of the
strategic importance of Cyprus and decided they needed to
retain only small sovereign base areas for their defense
purposes[Ref ll:p. 32]. The question of Cyprus ' s future arose
immediately. In order to resolve the problem, Turkey, Greece
and Great Britain signed a set of accords with Cyprus in 1959.
While granting independence to Cyprus, they prohibited Cyprus
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from partition or union with another independent country.
These accords, called the Treaty of Guarantee, also prescribed
certain percentages for majority and minority participation in
the Cypriot Army and Civil Service and reserved the right for
each signing nation to unilaterally defend the treaty's
provisions. [Ref 17:p. 20]
Cyprus became an independent state in 1960. Since
then, the desire of the island's pro-Greek majority to unite
with Greece and not remain a separate entity caused major
unrest between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In late 1963, this
unrest reached the point where the island was split by civil
war. In order to resolve the conflict, a conference took
place in London in January 1964 which led to a U.N. resolution
to place a peace-keeping force on Cyprus [Ref 17: p. 21].
This force, the United Nation's Peace-Keeping Force in
Cyprus, arrived on Cyprus on March 14, 1964. Even the use of
these U.N. forces couldn't stop heavy fighting between the two
communities. As a result of serious defeats for the Turks,
the Turkish government decided to uphold the Accord's
provisions and prepared to land troops on Cyprus. The
operation was stopped after President Johnson sent a personal
letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu.
The "Johnson Letter" was one of the major turning
points in U.S. -Turkish relations. It warned that if Turkish
action in Cyprus brought on a Soviet invasion of Turkey, the
U.S. and NATO would not be obligated to protect Turkey. It
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also warned that U.S. military equipment could not be used in
a Cyprus intervention [Ref ll:p. 33]. The letter led to the
abandonment of the plan for Turkish military intervention in
Cyprus, as requested by President Johnson. Nevertheless,
Turkish military aircraft flew a number of missions in support
of Turkish Cypriot positions.
While the Johnson Letter did not cause a major break
with the U.S., it did significantly affect Turkish public
opinion and caused a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy
away from total dependence upon the U.S. [Ref 13:p. 114-115].
The relationship which had been born with the Truman Doctrine,
and had grown from that time, was never again to be based on
as much trust and so strong a foundation as before the Cyprus
crisis of 1964.
In November 1967, intercommunal fighting broke out on
Cyprus again, and again the Turkish government prepared to use
military intervention to protect its interests on the island.
It issued an ultimatum to the government of Greece, stating
that Turkish troops would intervene if peace was not restored
and Greek troops illegally present on Cyprus withdrawn [Ref
ll:p. 33]. Again, U.S. and UN efforts restored the peace,
leaving two independent armed groups on Cyprus, with UN troops
providing buffer zones.
In 1974, the situation worsened. A number of Greek
military officers, sent to Cyprus as advisors to the Cyprus
National Guard, participated in a coup against President
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Makarios on 15 July 1974. These officers were under the
orders of the Athens government, rather than being responsive
to Makarios. Acting on the orders of the Athens government,
they replaced Makarios with Nicos Sampson, who had been anti-
British and anti-Turk [Ref ll:p. 34]. In view of his previous
anti-Turkish activity, he was an unacceptable choice for both
Turks and Turk Cypriots.
The U.S. did not initially make any statements or take
any action to place responsibility for the coup with the Greek
junta, or to request withdrawal of the Greek officers who had
led the coup. This seemed to imply a tacit approval of
Sampson as the leader of Cyprus. Nor did the Turks see any
action being taken by the U.S. or the UN to restore the
neutral government of Makarios. In fact, all signs indicated
that "enosis" (union with Greece) was about to become a
reality.
Following the coup, the Turkish government asked for
British intervention under the terms of the 1959 treaty. When
this was refused, Turkey sent troops to Cyprus on 20 July
1974. The intervention resulted in the fall of the Greek
military junta and the replacement of Sampson by a much more
moderate and respected Greek Cypriot. The question of cutting
off aid because of the use of U.S. arms by the Turks arose
immediately and finally ended with an arms embargo. The
intervention also caused massive population shifts on the
island, which brought about its effective partition into a
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Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south. [Ref 17: p.
32-33]
The Cyprus problem remained unresolved and continues
to cause tension between Turkey and Greece. The November 1983
declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
recognized by Turks but deemed legally invalid by the U.N.
Security Council, further exacerbated the situation. Greece
continues to demand the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from
Cyprus, which Turkey maintains are essential for the
protection of the island's 18 percent Turkish minority against
Greek Cypriot domination.
2. Points Of Contention in the Aegean Region
Conflicts between Greece and Turkey over territorial
rights and interests in the Aegean Sea continued to resist
solution in the 1970s and 1980s and brought the two countries
close to war on more than one occasion. A fundamental source
of contention was the right to explore for minerals, primarily
oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. The lack of agreement about what
constitutes the Aegean continental shelf caused two different
definitions by both sides. Turkey defined the Aegean shelf as
a natural prolongation of the Anatolian coast, whereas Greece
claimed that the Greek islands had their own shelves.
The issue was further complicated by Greece's claim to
territorial waters surrounding all of its 2,383 Aegean
islands. Turkey has maintained that if Greece carried out its
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threat to extend its six-nautical-mile territorial claim
around each island to 12 nautical miles, the action would be
considered a cause for war. War nearly occurred in 1976 and
1987, when both countries sent seismic-research ships to
prospect in disputed waters and subsequently proclaimed a
state of military alert. The threat of war has receded as a
result of announcements by both governments that they would
not move into the disputed waters. [Ref 14: p. 3 01]
The issue of the right to control the airspace over
the Aegean is another source of conflict between Turkey and
Greece[Ref ll:p. 27]. For a number of years, this meant that
planes could not fly directly between Turkey and Greece.
Disagreements over the median line, dividing the Aegean into
approximately equal sectors of responsibility, remain
unresolved [Ref 14:p. 302].
The offshore islands, which belong to Greece, have
been another issue between the two countries for many years.
Because of their strategic position (some of these islands can
be seen from Turkish territory very clearly) , Turks have been
very sensitive concerning their militarization by Greece.
Although both the 1923 Treaty of Lousanne and the 1947 Treaty
of Paris require a demilitarized Aegean, Turkey has maintained
that Greece has fortified the islands in violation of these
treaties. Turkey responded to the Greek buildup on these
islands by creating an Aegean army in western Anatolia,
accelerating a mutual military buildup in that region.
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As a result of these developments, Greece has repeatedly
requested from the U.S. and NATO a security guarantee of its
eastern borders against Turkey. Turkey, however, regards this
request as inconsistent with the principles of the NATO
alliance, stating repeatedly that it has no claims on Greek
territory, either in the Aegean islands or in Thrace, the
northeastern part of Greece which borders Turkey. [Ref 15:p.
316]
Because of the significant and persistent political
tension between Turkey and Greece, maintenance of a stable
military balance in the Aegean region has been an important
factor in the provision of U.S. security assistance for the
region. Section 620C(b) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act
stipulates that U.S. security assistance to Turkey and Greece
"shall be designed to ensure that the present balance of
military strength among countries of this region ... is to be
preserved." In general, the U.S. has dealt with this
requirement by maintaining a seven-to-ten ratio in its
assistance to Greece and Turkey, i.e., Greece is guaranteed $7
of military aid for every $10 that Turkey gets. Furthermore,
in recent years the U.S. Congress also tried to impose
conditions linking aid to Turkey to progress on a Cyprus
settlement.
The Turkish government regarded the seven-to-ten ratio as
inequitable given that Turkey had a population five times that
of Greece, with corresponding heavier NATO commitments and a
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less resilient economy. It also rejected the perception
implied in this ratio that Turkey constitutes a military
threat to Greece. Nevertheless, the Fiscal Year 1994 funding
levels for Greece and Turkey sustain the se\ n-to-ten ratio of
security assistance that Congress has maintained for the two
countries since Fiscal Year 1980[Ref 16:p. 17].
C. THE GULF WAR
As discussed earlier, Turkey has for many years focused on
Europe, attempting to integrate itself into the European
community. As part of that policy, it has virtually turned
its back on the Middle East, even though for centuries Turkey
was predominantly a Middle East power. 5
Today the principal threat to Turkey's security originates
in the Middle East [Ref 19:p. 31]. Radical groups, such as
the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) , the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Hizbollah, which are
carrying out subversive operations against the Turkish state,
are based there. These groups have mounted a formidable
threat to Turkey's internal security in the current period.
In this context, the Gulf War represents the most recent
major turning point for Turkey's foreign and defense policy.
In order to understand how the Gulf War affected Turkey, two
5For a review of Turkey's experience as a major Middle
Eastern power, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World
Affairs . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.
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important different events have to be taken into
consideration
.
1. Operation Desert Storm
At the direction of the late President Turgut Ozal,
Turkey played a major role in Operation Desert Storm.
Beginning in August 1990, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
and lasting until December 1991, Turkey provided full support
for Operation Proven Force, the air combat operations
conducted by U.S. forces from Turkish bases as an adjunct of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm[Ref 20:p. 55]. For the
first time, the U.S. conducted combat operations from Turkey,
despite the historic and deeply ingrained opposition to
foreign activities in their homeland felt by the Turks.
Although Turkey did not go to war with Iraq, the
precautions taken by Turkey—such as the interdiction of
Iraq's oil pipelines through Turkey and stationing of U.S.




Another important observation with regard to the
Turkish position in Operation Desert Storm deals with changes
to the principles of Turkish foreign policy laid down by its
founder Kemal Ataturk. According to Ataturk, the Turks have
to take pains to maintain good relations with their immediate
neighbors—Iraq, Iran and Syria. This policy was meant to
offset distrust among the neighbors caused by the policies of
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the Ottoman Empire. During the six decades since its
establishment, Turkey maintained this principle. However,
with the development of the Kuwait crisis and under the
leadership of the late President Mr. Ozal, Turkey changed
course and actively supported the coalition efforts against
Iraq. [Ref 19:p. 38]
2. Operation Provide Comfort
Following the war, Turkey was forced to address
another issue in the eastern region. As a result of the post-
conflict Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, Turks witnessed the abrupt
and unexpected stampede of thousand of Kurds into their
homeland. Operation Provide Comfort—the coalition effort to
provide humanitarian relief to more than 500,000 Kurdish
refugees who fled from the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein into
southeastern Turkey—tested Turkey's pro-coalition policy in
two main areas.
First, it strained Turkey's economy in ways that it
could not absorb. Ankara had to care for the Kurdish
refugees. Second, the problem had also a security dimension.
While the Turkish army is striving to restore order in that
region against the radical groups (i.e., PKK) , with the chaos
resulting from Operation Desert Storm and Operation Provide
Comfort, it was attacked by the most violent wing of the
Kurdish movement [Ref 19:p. 41]. Thus, while world public
opinion embraced the Kurds, the Turkish security forces have
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been harshly criticized for its response to the Kurdish
separatists.
In the light of the above discussion, it is quite
plausible to assert that the U.S. and Turkey had very close
defense cooperation during 1991 and 1992. Turkey stood by the
U.S. throughout both Operation Desert Storm and Operation
Provide Comfort. A close look at Figures 6 through 20 reveals
the situation in terms of arms transactions between the U.S.
and Turkey during this period.
FMS Deliveries, which are represented in Figures 6, 7 and
8, indicate that Turkey reached the highest level in this
account during 1991 and 1992. According to Figures 9, 10 and
11, which demonstrate FMFP Grants, Turkey again received its
highest portion of this account in this period.
FMFP Loans and the DCS account represent a different view.
FMFP Loans (Figure 12) and DCS (Figure 15) for Turkey dropped
to very low levels for 1991 and 1992 compared to past years.
However, FMFP Loans for Europe and World (Figures 14 and 13)
and DCS for Europe and World (Figures 17 and 16) also show
very low levels during this period. It can be argued that the
drop in these accounts was not unique to Turkey. Neither
Turkey nor the other recipient countries benefitted much from
these two accounts in 1991 and 1992.
As Figures 18, 19 and 20 demonstrate, Turkey essentially
maintained its portion in the IMET Expenditures account in
1991 and 1992. Although IMET funds didn't reach their highest
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portion in this period, the aid received by Turkey during the
Gulf War was significant.
In conclusion, the Gulf War confirmed Turkey's importance
to the West and especially the U.S. In spite of its
historical, religious, and cultural ties to the Middle East,
Turkey again showed its support for the military policies of
the Western democracies and reinforced its position as a
"reliable" ally to the U.S. and NATO. U.S. security
assistance to Turkey during the Gulf War, mostly in the form
of grants rather than loans and direct purchases, reached peak
levels.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research has been to bring together in
one document as much of the unclassified information as
possible concerning security assistance from the United States
to Turkey between 1950 and 1992. It has identified the
factors that have affected the U.S. -Turkey security assistance
relationship during this period and provided specific data on
the amount of U.S. security assistance to Turkey.
Interpretation of this data led to the conclusions addressed
below.
Turkey occupies a unique and strategic position in U.S.
defense policy. The United States does not view Turkey as an
ordinary foreign country. As both the total composite and
annual amounts of U.S. security assistance provided to Turkey
show, Turkey received a considerable amount of military
assistance from the United States between 1950 and 1992.
Over the period during which the United States and Turkey
developed a security relationship, several factors stand out
as most influential. Specifically, the Korean War, NATO and
the Gulf War enhanced this relationship. Greek-Turkish
relations, on the other hand, tended to weaken it. The levels
of transactions, depicted in Figures 6 through 20, confirmed
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that these factors had a significant influence in shaping U.S.
security assistance to Turkey.
Of the five different components of the U.S. security
assistance program, four of them — FMFP Grants, FMFP Loans,
FMS Deliveries and IMET Expenditures — are viewed as the most
significant ones. The DCS account is of little significance
compared to other four accounts. Thus, Turkey benefitted
mostly from arms transactions financed by USG funds instead of
its own financial resources.
During the period 1950-1992, the levels of FMFP Grants,
FMFP Loans and IMET Expenditures varied the most. FMS
Deliveries and DCS accounts did not show as much variance as
the other three do. This is because these three accounts —
FMFP Grants, FMFP Loans and IMET Expenditures — are financed
by the U.S. government. As such, they have been subject to
the positive and negative factors influencing U.S. policy
towards Turkey.
It should be noted here that some of this variance can not
be explained by those factors. This suggests that there are
some other factors that affect the U.S. -Turkey security
assistance relationship.
For most of the period from 1950 through 1992, Turkey's
share of U.S. arms aid has followed the pattern of U.S. aid to
Europe-NATO. This pattern did not minimize the significance
of the Korean War, Greek-Turkish relations and the Gulf War
for the U.S. -Turkey relationship. NATO was the backbone of
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this relationship and determined the level of U.S. security
assistance provided to Turkey. Nevertheless, the other three
factors either intensified or lessened this pattern for
certain periods of time.
This trend is very important, because with the collapse of
the Soviet Union and communism in the late 1980s, the apparent
purpose of NATO's existence had disappeared. Thus, NATO's
future remains uncertain. The important question, then, is
this: Will NATO continue to determine the U.S. security
assistance provided to Turkey in the future as it did until
now? Or, with the diminishing importance of NATO, will
bilateral relations and U.S. policy toward the Middle East
gain more importance in determining U.S. security assistance
to Turkey?
In this context, the Gulf War represents a good example.
During the war, United States-Turkey defense relations gained
a new dimension with the enhanced cooperation of the two
countries' armed forces. More bilateral relations may follow,
depending upon the security environment in Europe and the
Middle East.
The U.S. -Turkey security assistance relationship does not
follow a pattern similar to U.S. arms relationships with the
world. The five components of the U.S. security assistance
program provided to the world show significant variances
compared to Turkey's portion in these accounts. This fact
leads to the conclusion that the factors which affected U.S.-
89
Turkey security assistance relationship did not affect all
countries in the world as they did Turkey.
The arms embargo imposed by the U.S. on Turkey during the
period 1975-1978 was selective. While Turkey was prohibited
from receiving U.S. grant funds, it did acquire U.S. armaments
by loans and cash purchases. The U.S. did not stop all arms
shipments to Turkey. It only shifted the scope of its
security assistance to Turkey.
The U.S. Congress has played an important role in shaping
the U.S. -Turkey security relationship. The political
dimension of this relationship has an enormous impact on the
amount of U.S. military aid to Turkey. Congress exerted its
power in different time periods in different ways.
Especially during the 1970s, when presidential authority
was weakened, Congress was directly involved in determining
the level of U.S. security assistance to Turkey and
successfully curbed it between 1975 and 1978 despite the
administration's opposition.
Although Congress continuously supported the President's
proposed security assistance levels to Turkey during the
1950s, 1960s and 1980s, when presidential authority was in its
highest levels, beginning in 1980 it also succeeded in linking
the annual amount of U.S. security assistance to Greece to the
amount provided to Turkey. This is a clear indication of how
Congress views the regional security effects of U.S. security
assistance to this region of the world.
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Moreover, as an ultimate authority which authorizes and
appropriates United States Government funds to provide arms
and services to foreign countries, Congress also changed the
scope of the U.S. security assistance to Turkey on several
occasions.
Congressional involvement in determining U.S. security
assistance to Turkey has negatively affected Turkish ability
to acquire contemporary U.S. armaments and services. This is
because of the limited resources of the Turkish economy for
its arms transactions with the U.S.
In conclusion, the security assistance relationship
between the U.S. and Turkey has been strong, in spite of
certain difficulties which have occurred during the last 42
years. Given the new security environment in Europe and
Middle East, it is not expected that the security assistance
relations between the two nations will undergo rapid, major
changes. Although Turkey has diversified its arms suppliers
by turning more to European nations and development of a
domestic industry in recent years, the U.S. will probably
remain the major weapons supplier for the near future.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
In this research several areas were encountered which were




The seven-to-ten ratio which was maintained by the U.S. in
its military assistance to Greece and Turkey is one of these
areas. Although there is no special provision in U.S. law
with regard to this ratio, since 1980 the annual amount of
U.S. security assistance to Turkey and Greece confirms this
tacit requirement. Both the implementation and the
development of this ratio should be included in this research.
A second area of interest concerns the military
cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey during the Gulf War.
Although Turkey did not go to war against Iraq on the U.S.
side, the prospects for a second front against Iraq may have
instigated a controversy between the two countries. However,
because of the lack of unclassified, official information on
this issue, it is not included in this research. It is hoped
that a detailed examination will shed light on these events
and further contribute to an understanding of the U.S. -Turkey
defense relationship during the Gulf War.
Another area for further research is the kind of arms
provided to Turkey by the United States security assistance
program during the 1950-1992 period. This research has
primarily focused on the dollar amount of arms transactions
that have occurred in the past 42 years. The types of weapons
(e.g., offensive or defensive, high or low technology, the
diversification of these weapons as ground, air or naval) have
not been taken into consideration while appraising these
transactions. Such a different approach may lead to different
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interpretations of U.S. -Turkey security assistance
relationship.
In this research, Turkey's portion of U.S. security
assistance was compared with Europe-NATO's portion of U.S.
security assistance and total U.S. security assistance
provided to the world. Comparison of Turkey's portion of U.S.
security assistance with another or a number of different
countries' portions of U.S. security assistance is another
area for further research. This kind of study may identify
new factors that affected the U.S. -Turkey security assistance
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1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postrgaduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5101
















7. DISAM/ Library Bldg 125 1
2335 Seventh Street
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433-7803
8. Embassy of Turkey 1
Office of the Supply Attache (NAVY)
2202 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC. 20008
9. Milli Savunma Bakanligi 1
Dis Tedarik Daire Baskanligi
Bakanliklar - ANKARA - TURKEY 06100
10. Deniz Kuwetleri Komutanligi 1
Plan Prensipler Daire Baskanligi
Bakanliklar - ANKARA - TURKEY 06100
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11. Deniz Harp Okulu Komutanligi
Okul Kutuphanesi
Tuzla - ISTANBUL - TURKEY
12 . Alpar Karaahmet
Ivedik cad. 107/54
Demetevler - ANKARA - TURKEY 06200
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